



Papua Conflict: An Article Review from the Best Conflict Resolution Method

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Abstract

This article is aimed to review conflict resolution process of Armed Criminal Group in Papua (KKB). This study is a scientific-article review using comparison technique, which compares horse trading method, counter-insurgency (COIN) model, and Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) to later review the best method in conflict resolution and renew or develop it. This study starts from revealing the background of Armed Criminal Group (KKB) happening in Papua, and then discussing conflict resolution process referring to the separatist movement development from KKB using horse trading method, which is proven effective to resolve this conflict if it is supported by the trust between two parties to have a dialogue where both parties are allowed to deliver their purposes openly. It is different from the application of McCormick's COIN strategy model which narrowly fails in resolving Papua conflict, and even is possible to create a chance of the new dynamics' existence in its international dimension, so it is needed to have a new interpretation towards COIN model in Papua, which is by giving solution to conflict-root elimination instead of total elimination by military. Meanwhile, applying Military Operations Other Than War approach (OMSP) is mandatory which is done by every country in order to tackle separatism movements. By those three models mentioned earlier, several strategic steps are formulated later in conflict resolution of Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Papua.

Keywords: *Counter-Insurgency; Horse-Trading; Military operations other than war; Papua Conflict.*

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Introduction

The issue about Papua is a national issue which has to be noticed comprehensively in the relevance of 1945 Constitutes (UD 1945) mandate. Turning a blind eye to the existing issue in the area of Papua (either Papua Province or West Papua Province) is an unconstitutional attitude. Republic of Indonesia Government is fully aware of this constitution's message and owing to that the efforts in settling the situation are continuously done. In Reformation era, it is fully noticed by many parties including government, NGO, both local and international observer for Papua conflict that those efforts in settling the situation still face many obstacles, yet it means there is no attention stagnancy and government's efforts to be with Papuan in building a better future together (Noor, 2016). In the further development, Papua conflict turns out to be Armed Criminal Group—*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (KKB)* of Papua.

Armed Criminal Group (KKB) has been always doing separatism and attacks towards Indonesia. In 2018, an incident of the murder of 28 workers of PT Istaka Karya who were working on a project of Trans Papua road by Armed Criminal Group (KKB) took place in Nduga Regency (Suropati, 2019). This incident is a reminder that the issue about conflict in Papua has not come to its end. In the development, fire shot actions between armed criminal group took place in Dambet Village, Beoga District, Puncak Regency on the 25th of April 2021 which caused the Chief of National Intelligence Agency for Papua Area, General I Gusti Putu

Danny Nugraha, draw his last breath due to a gunshot wound in his head. The commander of Regional Military Command XVII/Cendrawasih, General Major Ignatius Yogo Triyono, said that at that time the Chief of National Intelligence Agency for Papua Area was doing a field observation in Dambet Village with his staff (Costa, 2021).

Recently, KKB stopped several staffs of Pamrahwan task force from Raider Infantry Battalion 301/Prabu Kian Santang, and Infantry Battalion 403/Wirasada Pratista at Dua Kampung Seramkatop bridge, Sembakon District on the 18th of May 2021 at around 19:00 Eastern Indonesian Time (GMT +5). Because of that, four members of Indonesian National Military were shot and wounded. Those four members are Second Sergeant Kris, Private First Class Kuku whose right leg was wounded by a gunshot, while Private First Class Romi suffered from a gunshot in his right leg. Then, on the 19th of May 2021, Indonesian National Military-Indonesian Police force hunted Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Ngalum Kupel which was known that it was under the command of Lamek Taplo (Hermanto, 2021).

This study aims to appraise the solving solution for Armed Criminal Group (KKB) conflict in Papua which is continuously happening and potentially lasting for longer time. Besides, this is also going to show the diversity of society's attitude towards their existence in the scope area of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which in general shows that the option to do separatism from the state is not Papua society's main option. The term "separatist" or "separatism" themselves refer to any activity of someone or any group or any community which is under the authority of a bigger unity which tends to separate or step out from the mentioned bigger community or unity, in a purpose to stand independently as an independent country or nation (Pratiwi, 2017). The will of separatism aimed to achieve better life under the political government of other state or as an independent state (Maharani, 2022).

Peter Wallenstein (2015) presents that one of the conflict-resolution mechanisms is using horse-trading model. Horse-trading mechanism is undergone by compromising between two parties, where the party which has the conflict gets what they want in a condition that all demands from the other party has to be fulfilled, and the purpose of the other party is also fulfilled. This resolution mechanism produces a new decision after both parties communicate to find a way out together, in a condition where both parties put aside each's ego (Febrianti, Arum, Dermawan, & Akim, 2019).

In the military resolution, especially counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy with diamond-based model by McCormick, becomes a reference to put a security issue to an end in an internal conflict between Indonesian government and Papua-pro-independent group. Those military operations can still hold up Papua conflict in a local scale and avoid conflict escalation to become high-intensity conflict. However, some developments in these recent four-year period in Papua conflict need to get certain attention (Ramdhan, 2021).

The conception to defence the development of Papua KKB as a separatism in Indonesian society in nature is by being aware continuously of social phenomena, especially radicalism which potentially threatens the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The form of defence and tackle for KKB in Indonesia, can be done by Military Operations Other Than War—*Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP)* which is regulated in the Law number 34 Year 2004 about Indonesian National Military. In the article 7 point 2, it is explained about the basic tasks division of Indonesian National Military by Military Operations for War—*Operasi Militer untuk Perang (OMP)* and Military Operations Other than War—*Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP)*, and the military-operations-other-than-war implementation which has to be based on state's political policy and decision. Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) is a future certainty in a country, because although there is no war, there is still another function which is different and bargaining (Pratiwi, 2017). By the use of horse trading method, counter-insurgency (COIN) and Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) it is expected to find the most appropriate conflict resolution in tackling the conflict of Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Papua.

Literature Review and Research Focus

Factors causing conflict

In various conflicts, communal conflict occurs due to spatially dependent on latent factors. This means that communal conflict clustered because of the grouping of latent factors within the regency. Heterogeneity in religion and ethnicity are a few examples, communal conflict is positively correlated with poverty and economic inequality, elite capture, and the regency's weak capacity to manage the fiscal resources (Sujarwoto, 2015). Hence, it can be concluded that the main factor of the conflict is the diversity or the heterogeneity level in a group. Ethnic conflict is rooted in how a nation country faces the ethno-nationalism. Abandonment of the ethno-nationalism issue in Indonesia helps us to explain the inflow of ethnic conflict today (Mardiansyah, 2001). The presence of ethnic conflict in certain community groups will determine the way a nation resolves the ongoing ethnic conflict.

The management of community-based conflict has been conducted by a case study of Community Oriented Policing (COP) in Malioboro, Yogyakarta. The proposed idea is that COP is an ideal mirror to implement policing by managing the conflict within the framework of human rights, democracy, and local wisdom. COP reflected the change in approach to conflict management and the creation of social order in the public space, from a country-based approach to a society-based approach. Besides, society's social capital mobilization is considered an important variable in conflict management conducted by COP. The conceptual framework is based on the latest and in-depth research, this study developed as a practical academic narrative (Zuhdan, 2013). Therefore, it can be concluded that community-based conflict management is heavily influenced by the community's local social activity. Which is related to the critical-thinking attitude, democracy, and local wisdom that become the local community's response.

Structurally, the land conflict in Indonesia occurred as a result of centralized management of land ownership. Since the method is still maintained in the reformation era, the conflict remains to this day, especially in certain parts of Indonesia. In a case study on claiming land rights in Ketajek Plantation, in Jember, East Java, a better and fairer land management system has been proposed. The land rights claim itself is not limited to land ownership disputes. Especially on the land system with preserved social values (Aprianto, 2009). Through the particular case study, it can be concluded that conflict could occur due to land rights disputes. The land disputes will also influence the characteristics of the society living in the surrounding area.

Conflict resolution

Numerous efforts to resolve the conflict in Papua has been conducted by Indonesian government from repressive and militaristic actions to non-repressive actions (Mardiani, Anisah, Hasibuan, & Fadilah, 2021). Despite the numbers of resolution conducted by Indonesia government, the conflict management conducted by Indonesian government to resolve the conflict in Papua is considered lacking to accomplish the will of Papuans, hence the conflict remains to this day and has expanded to other aspects (Zam & Himmawan, 2023). The resolutions conducted by Indonesian government with related parties from Papua is deemed not effective to resolve the conflict (Mardiani et al., 2021). In facing the conflict, the government needs a careful planning starting from conflict prevention, preparation if conflict occurs, emergency response planning when conflict occurs, and post-conflict recovery plans (Robby & Akhiruddin, 2021).

The conflict in Papua consists of local dimension and international dimension. The local dimension includes the injustice and inequality development and justification of the integration that started in 1969. Meanwhile, the international dimension includes the pressure on human rights issues, the existence of PT Freeport, the raising issue of Free West Papua by social network and Papuan diaspora, and the raising issue of West Papua by discussion in the 46th Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (Muntaha, Kharisma, & Hanita, 2019). In resolving the conflict resolution, Indonesian government have to conduct 1) reconciliation between Papuans who oppose the government with the government itself and 2) welfare development as a prosperity

approach (Samudro et al., 2022). However, the government need to examine the approach used to face the conflict for the past 15 years to understand the risks of the approach. The failure in understanding and adaptation with the relevant natural context in Papua will result in increased tensions, more resistance movement, and disagreement between the policy and the social environment (Ruhyanto, 2016).

Environment played a double-edged sword. Besides the possibility of becoming a source of conflict, the environment is useful for developing continuous peace. However, the discourse on developing peace through environmental cooperation in Indonesia needs to be discussed more. This condition prompted an unequal understanding of the role of the environment, whether it is to acquire peace or conflict. For the regional conflict in Aceh, using the environmental perspective, peace development in Aceh has been raised since the Helsinki Accords which required to merging of two routes in the same way. Firstly, the government of Aceh and other stakeholders have to quell all the potential factors of new conflict (especially environmental factors). Secondly, the environment of cooperation is necessary to strengthen social cohesion and eradicate environmental injustice (Martanto, 2009). Based on that statement, it can be concluded that the environment also played a role in creating a conflict in a region or community.

In facing the multidimensional conflict in the region of Papua, to understand and interpret the empirical phenomenon regarding the induced conflict in the region of Papua, the theory of environmental scarcity is used to outline the conflict factors that are induced into three dimensions: the cause of environmental scarcity, social conflict, and the type on conflicts (Martanto, 2007). It can be concluded that the effort to map out the conflict in Papua can be done with an environmental approach. The start is defining the environment, analyzing the social character of the local society, and then defining the conflict that possibly occurs. After that, the effort to resolve the conflict cannot be separated from the security policy in resolving the conflict that occurred in Papua. This needs the government's role as a regulator in policy-making as well as conflict management (Arfani, 2005). Therefore, the government is involved in conflict resolution through the policies it makes.

After the occurrence of many conflicts in various regions in Indonesia, a peace agreement is made to diminish the conflict. Now Indonesia is entering the post-conflict era. Democratization and decentralization prompted the reconstruction of social conditions, economy, and safety in society. The peace construction strategy post-conflict in terms of developing the basis of peace becomes crucial to achieving peace consolidation and continuous development (Triyono, 2009). Through this statement, it can be derived that to achieve peace along with sustainable development, an early prepared strategy is necessary. Conflict resolution with a social approach is also needed to face social conflict in society. Which is through focus group discussions with the involved community in the conflict region (Maika, 2006). Hence, it can be concluded that to resolve the occurring social conflict, focus group discussion can be performed to listen to the community's aspirations and complaints along with seeking the solution based on the conflict-involved community's perspective.

In the demilitarization phenomenon during the democratic transition era, a concept of problem mapping and efforts to use the opportunities to decrease the military approach emerged. This concept used a democratic approach to resolve the ongoing conflict (Sujito, 2002). It can be concluded that a democratic approach was chosen to resolve the conflict to diminish the militarization. The democratic approach emphasizes discussion so the conflict resolution obtained is also based on the community's agreement, not only based on a single authority as in the military field. In the effort of conflict resolution post-federalism, integration between policy and regions' autonomy is necessary to intervene in the conflict possibilities that might occur (Lele, 2001). These efforts were carried out to avoid anarchism in conflict resolution which commonly resulted in public criticisms (Lay, 2000). Hence, democracy is the proposed solution for the ongoing conflict.

Several political trials have been conducted by Indonesian government to response the conflict using security approach to prosperity approach (Viartasiwi, 2014). The local political contestation in Papua for the last decade has been going vigorously, moreover post the

implementation of special autonomy which was followed by the forming of new governmental units in various corners of Papua. In the middle of this political contestation, identity, and background culture become the dominant variable. The local elites play a role in managing the identity, particularly in the middle of the political contestation by taking an example of the forming of Manokwari as the capital of West Papua (Suryawan, 2011). Thus, the local elites, which in this case are known as public figures play a role in forming the local community's identity or culture. Including keeping the local societal peace through a political approach.

A series of peaceful campaigns was carried out by the Papua Peaceful Network for the Peaceful Land of Papua. This informal network consists of several groups of civilians such as religious organizations, ethnic groups, NGOs, and academics. PPN aims to connect the groups involved in the Papua land conflicts and help the Papuan citizens and the Indonesian Government to prepare an inclusive dialogue. Although the series of peaceful campaigns was carried out by the PPN at the national level and regional levels between the years 2013 and 2016, politically, the violence has increased in Papua. On the other hand, the central government only focused on the matter of social and economic development, especially the infrastructure project, not the political matter. The government officials involved in the peace campaigns conducted by the PPN do not have enough power to implement a few of the peace recommendations since the national government does not have the map for Jakarta-Papua peaceful conflict resolution. The continuous informal communication among the parties involved in the conflict is a necessary condition, but it is not enough to generate a positive peace. Thus, the national government is strongly recommended to conduct an inclusive national dialogue with Papuans (Suryawan, 2011). Therefore, a forum that can accommodate the will of the local community and the government party as the policymakers is greatly necessary to handle the conflict resolution in Papua.

The history of Papua conflict

Since the proclamation of Indonesian Republic's independence on the 17th of August 1945, sovereignty hand-over after Round Table Conference (KMB) on the 27th of December 1949, until Papua came back to be part of Indonesia on the 1st of May 1963, Papua has never stopped to be in chaos. Different parties both domestic and foreign, one of them is The Indonesian Institute of Science—*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI)*, has done a research to identify the problems, so the conflict anatomy can be mapped out and solved. There are at least five strategic issues which are the root of Papua issue, which are the history of Papua's integration to Indonesia; politic and human right abuse; the failure of Papua development; Jakarta-policy inconsistency; and the strategy in tackling security distraction. Since Papua was freed and came back to Indonesian Motherland on the 1st of May 1963, the history of Papua's integration has been always an issue for Papua nationalist group. They consider the process of Papua's integration to Indonesia was not valid because it was full of manipulation. That assumption surely is related to intrigue political authority during decolonisation process since Round Table Conference (KMB) (Suropati, 2019).

The politic and human right abuse frequently happen because of New Order's policy which tended to put aside persuasive approach, on the contrary prioritise repressive actions. The failure of Papua's development is triggered by many factors, which are New Order's policy which makes Papuans casted away. Other than that, the influence of international capitalism which at the end exploits Papua's natural resources. The inconsistency of Jakarta policy, especially related to the implementation of Special Autonomy—*Otonomi Khusus (Otsus)* mainly in the moments of post-reformation government. The strategy in tackling security distraction, especially the abusive actions which were done by Armed Criminal Group (KKB) is considered ineffective because the strategy which was implemented take less psychological condition and socio-culture of the locals into account.

The background of Papua conflict

There are enormous number of writings and researches which study deeply the background of conflict in Papua both using multi-discipline approach and inter-disciplinary approach. The root cause of the conflict in Papua is very complex including the historical matters, ideology,

to the feeling of injustice experience by the people of Papua (Mardiani et al., 2021). Other study also stated that the root cause of the conflict in Papua is very complex, but mainly related to identity (Samudro et al., 2022). According to study on the identity of Papua by Putra (2024), a lot of Papuans felt disappointed of the negative treatment and perceptions of Indonesian to Papua, but many of them still consider themselves as Indonesian. Although the infrastructure development in Papua is improving and prioritized in the era of Joko Widodo presidential, the hegemony of military approach used to for resolution escalated the conflict (Putra et al., 2024).

Meanwhile, a research done by Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) which is stated in a book entitled Papua Roadmap. The researchers in LIPI succeeded in formulating four basic issues, which are marginalisation of local Papuans, failure of development, military abuse and human right violation, until the process of Papua's integration to Indonesia which was considered invalid (Widjojo, 2009). Richard Chauvel, a historian about Papuan politic, concluded that at least there are four basic issues which can be identified, they are; (a) the disappointment because Papua land becomes a part of Indonesia, (b) the competition which is experienced by Papuan land elites with elites from outside of Papua who dominate the government since Dutch colonisation, (c) economic and government development which is different, and (d) native Papuans' marginalisation because of the arrival of visitors. Those views become the legitimation for groups who are not satisfied so it creates groups of pro-independence of Papua (Chauvel, 2005).

Papuan study team from Indonesian Civil Society Relation, Initiative, and Participation Empowerment Organisation (YAPPIKA) lists at least three factors which are the background of Papuans demands, they are historical factor, Papuan nationalism and identity factor, and injustice factor. Specially for injustice factor, the sub-factors include Papuan natural resource exploitation, the low public participation, visitors's domination, culture and violation's domination, and violation by military. The researches done by YAPPIKA involving Bambang Sugiono, Hendrikus Abraham Ondi, and Melkianus Huka turns interesting because they are generalised by long and comprehensive research process such as discussions and direct interviews with Papuan locals (Anugerah, 2019).

First, historical factor. Papuans assume that Papua has no connection to NKRI. There are several facts supporting this belief, which are (a) Papua was not part of Dutch East Indies based on Batavia Declaration on the 7th of March 1910. The area of Dutch East Indies covered from Aceh to Maluku was under the authority of Dutch East Indies Governor at that time, while Papua was directly under the authority of Dutch Government at Netherlands, (b) Public figures, especially youth figures of Papua were not involved in the Indonesian national movement which had started since 1908 under Budi Utomo and reached its peak by Youth Pledge on the 28th of October 1928. In that monumental moment for Indonesians, there was not even one Papuan youth figure who took part, (c) physically and in the term of culture, native Papuans are different from Indonesian majority people. Most of Indonesian people are the descendants of Malayan Mongoloid race with brownish skin and straight hair, while native Papuans are from Melanesian race. (d) Papuan people did not take part in the proclamation process on the 17th of August 1945. Papuans started to be the attention of Indonesian government after three years of independence. (e) In 1948, while Indonesia started to do efforts in taking Papua, The Dutch were preparing Papua for its independence by establishing different political parties, boards of districts as the place for gathering the Papuan public figures, until Papuan parliaments (Anugerah, 2019).

Second, identity issue and Papuan nationality. It has to be admitted that in the term of social and culture, native Papuans are different from Indonesian people. When the majority of Indonesians are dominated by Malayan group, physically Papuans are part of the group of Melanesians and the race of Negroid in Pacific. In the term of social, Papuans people have their own ways of life and views different from most of Indonesians. Papuans have their own authority which is very distinctive in ruling, developing the needs, and solving the problems based on their own cultural laws which burden their own people's cultural rights and obligation so it is a bit hard for them when there is a cultural crash with what the majority of Indonesians implement in their life. In the context of Papuan identity and nationalism, there are frictions

between Papuan locals and the visitors. Those frictions can be seen empirically in the daily bureaucracy and economic activities dynamics of Papuan people. In the bureaucracy and government life, main positions are always given to foreigners or visitors with the reason that Papuan locals are not ready yet to initiate. To occupy a position, Papuan locals are obliged to several difficult requirements, while foreigners and visitors are not (Anugerah, 2019).

The third factor is injustice. Injustice actions which are done towards Papuans are related to economic aspects including natural resources exploitation, low participation of locals, visitors' domination in government and economy, cultural colonisation and biased human resources' development, and military abuse. Special for military abuse, military abuse comes in several forms such as intimidation, terror, violation and murders. Murders commonly happen to militants, people who struggle for democracy, laws, culture, and humanity, including the demands for Papua's independence. The injustice such as social inequality experienced by Papuans resulted in different ideology in Papua, which caused contradiction with the ideology in Indonesia (Maharani, 2022). The discrimination and injustice in terms of community welfare and prosperity towards Papua intensify the separatism. Thus, the resistance is not only about freedom, but also about the fight for social and economic injustice for the Papuans (Hadi, 2021). In associated with the development process, there are also different narrations.

The narrations spread in Indonesia is that the development in Papua results the prosperity, education improvement, and empowerment of Papuans. Referring to fiscal decentralisation done by the central government to the Papuans areas by State Budget (APBN), General Funding Allocation (DAU), and Special Funding Allocation (DAK) to Papua which is the highest compared to the one to other provinces in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the opposite narration which is spread by the Papuan locals is the development which is done by the government of Indonesia has not been able to create prosperity and well-being as the national goal which is stated in the 1945 Consitute. For Papuan locals themselves, what happen in Papua is the exploitation of Natural Resources, native people marginalisation, natural damage caused by irresponsible exploitation done by foreign companies, and different human right violations in the name of politic and security stability (Anugerah, 2019).

Method

This study is conducted using the literature review method. A literature review allows researchers to obtain explanations in the process of investigating the effect or correlation between two or more specific or widespread variables. A literature review could be used to obtain explanations of the issue or problem formulations of the study. This method is used as the main methodology in this study on the armed conflict process in Papua with its resolution. This study is carried out by conducting in-depth reading on the journals that are references for the research topic. The references are related to the horse-trading method, COIN, and military operations other than war.

Results and Discussion

KKB Papua conflict resolution by Horse Trading

To analyse the conflict using this mechanism, what each party demands have to be identified. However, in the context of internal conflict resolution between Indonesian Government and separatism groups in Papua, it needs to find a meeting point for the issues which can be traded, it should be surely a worthy issue for both parties to come to an agreement. There are several issues which develop in Papua which give reactions to the occurrence of Papuan public disappointment, which are public service optimisation, human development issue which keeps considering cultural values, infrastructure development, political justice, racism issue and other things which are still in the scope of nation, not the separatism. Papua's side also needs to involve different stakeholders, which are Local Governments of Papua, both provinces and districts, mass organisations, cultural communities, public figures, youth figures,

and others. They are groups outside the Papuan separatism which can have a dialogue constructively with central government in order to get back a harmonic relationship with central government.

From conflict resolution mechanisms which have been done by Indonesian government, it is shown that Indonesian's main agenda is to keep Papua as a part of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia, to stop attacks which are done by KKB, and not to give any chance to KKB to do any referendum. Indonesian government side is the party with bigger authority compared to KKB. On the other hand, KKB side based on history and culture does not admit that Papua's areas are part of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia, so KKB demands a referendum towards Indonesian Government and by all means keep on working on separatism activities.

The main demands from all parties, are big and opposed to each other. In horse-trading mechanism, in order to the conflict resolution can be done, the demands which is hard to find the way out need to be put aside. However, because there is an authority in one of the parties which is Indonesian Government, it is impossible for Indonesia to give referendum towards KKB. Issues about sovereignty and unity of the nation are absolute issues for Indonesia. KKB itself considers Indonesian Government has been colonising Papua so far, and using ways which do not represent what Papuans really want in the moment of deciding that Papua's areas are parts of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. So in putting aside the purpose of Indonesia which has been so far considered so by Papuans, and this view should have been able to prove that Indonesia is a government which embraces and develops Papua, instead of colonising Papua. This complicated situation means that Indonesia is demanded to fulfil what KKB needs, at least as worthy as what KKB gets if they separate themselves from Indonesia.

The use of horse trading method in conflict resolution Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Papua have several strengths and weakness. This model has positive impacts towards Indonesian Government to give the best policy in responding to issues which happen so it can ease the conflict resolution peacefully (Febrianti et al., 2019). Which is without involving armed actions and violations towards local civilians. So, it is expected that both government and Armed Criminal Group (KKB) sides in Papua agree to reduce their demands. However, this method has a weakness which is by increasing the trading for the happening issues can trigger the make use of one side by an actor or a particular group of people. So it is necessary to pick the most appropriate actors who are involved in the escalation of the trading of currently happening conflict.

KKB Papua conflict resolution by counter-insurgency (COIN)

Papua conflict in McCormick's model is a conflict between Indonesian Government and Papuan insurgent/separatist groups. The definition of insurgency is a movement to overthrow government's authority by limited wars with armed confrontation (UK Ministry of Defence, 2014). Common tactics from an insurgent group is attacking the weakest point of a state by immersing into the society. Insurgent groups avoid direct confrontation as big-scaled wars because of the lack of military force. This strategy makes traditional approach no longer efficient because quelling insurgent groups sacrifice victims from civilians. Frequently, the victims of the insurgent quelling mission by a state are its own civilians.

From here, the concept of counter-insurgency (COIN) was invented, which is a special strategy to solve insurgency using the combination of military, paramilitary, politic, economy, psychology, and civil action components. Another definition of counter-insurgency is a government's effort to defeat insurgency movement by the combination of military, politic, economy, and psychology factors (Williams & McDonald, 2013). The centre of COIN strategy is achieving society's "heart and thought". The main assumption is that insurgent movement will collapse if they are disconnected from local society's support. David Galula assumes that an ideal COIN formula consists of 80% of politic and 20% of military (Galula, 2006). This means that in the 80% practical politic, it involves positive diplomatic and response from the society. So psychologically it has to be able to soothe heart and thought of the society.

The function of COIN strategy is aimed for quelling insurgency. However, insurgency still happens in Papua, it even gets a support from diplomatics from Pacific countries. While in

McCormick's strategy, international legitimation is the key in preventing insurgency and separatism effort in Papua. Theoretically, this is because the application of COIN strategy is based on the narrow definition, which is a war which is based on insurgency and the government, where the main purpose is to win heart and thought of the society. Other than that, although McCormick's model in the application in Papua conflict highlights the importance of international legitimation to quell Papuan insurgency, that model explains no basic assumption why a conflict can get an international actor's attention, or in this case conflict internationalisation. From here, literatures from conflict studies and international relations offer a new interpretation in the McCormick's diamond model in Papuan conflict. International relations's study, especially which is focused on international conflict, also offers an explanation why a conflict can have international dimension.

Counter-insurgency diamond model by McCormick is the general theoretical framework of Indonesian Military strategy in quelling Papuan insurgency. This model has strengths in the use of many different approaches in solving happening conflicts which is by political diplomatic, economy, social, culture, and ideology or local Papuans mental approach. However, in the reality, the application of McCormick's COIN strategy in narrow term is not only failed in resolving Papuan conflict, but also gives a space to create new dynamics in the international dimension of its conflict. COIN operation in Papua will not succeed if the prosperity of Papuan society is still ignored. The state has to be there as the protector of Papuan society. Not only to settle the conflict, the presence of the state as the protector also will close the international legitimation towards Papua's insurgency, especially closing political manoeuvres of Pacific countries towards the activities of United Liberation Movement for West Papua ULMWP in diplomatic arena (Ramdhan, 2021).

KKB Papua Conflict resolution by Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) approach

In Indonesia, OMSP term has just been officially recognised in 2002 as Defence Laws was legalised. Nevertheless, assisting force concept had been recognised far before that. In Soekarno's era, the rules about assisting force in the moment of peace were regulated in Government Law number 63 year 1954 about Request and Execution of Military Assistance as the replacement of President's Decree of Republic of Indonesia number 175 and 213 year 1952. Meanwhile, the military involvement in emergency situations, had just arisen in 1959 and was regulated in Government Law as The Replacement of Law number 23 year 1959 about Emergency Situations as The Replacement of Law number 74 year 1957 (State's Institution number 160 year 1957) and the Declaration of Emergency Situation (Mengko, 2015).

Adapting to Emergency Situation Regulation, assisting force regulation (in the moment of peace) was re-perfected by Government Regulation number 16 year 1960. In the further development in Soeharto's Presidential Era, discourses about assisting force became not significant. This was caused by Soeharto's authoritarian government system and the doctrine of Indonesian Armed Force's (ABRI) doubled function which legitimated military to be involved dominantly in civic fields especially the involvement in social and political role. By the fall of Soeharto's regime and Indonesia uses democracy system, doubled-function policy was omitted and Security Sector Reformation (RSK) started to run.

Then, the term Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) appeared in Article 10 Defence Law number 3 year 2002 about Defence, but the explanation about forms of OMSP had just come into existence in Article 7 Laws number 34 year 2004 about Indonesian National Military. The explanation of the forms of OMSP in Indonesian National Military also copes the types of assisting force's tasks which were previously in the TAP MPR (People's Consultative Assembly's Decree). The OMSP's different forms are divided into 14 forms of operations, which one of them is tackling armed separatism movement.

The regulation about Indonesian National Military's assisting task in the framework of OMSP is regulated partially and sectionally in several regulations as it is regulated in Law Number 7 year 2012 about Social Conflict Tackling, Law Number 3 of 2002 about Defence, President's Instruction about Internal Threats Handling Number 2 of 2013 and Law Number 9 of 2003 about Terrorism. Even, the regulation about military assisting task to the government

in this case is ministries and other institutions is only regulated in the form of memorandum of understanding between Indonesian National Military's Commander and the related ministries and institutions. In KKB tackling in Papua, there are basic principles which are used by Indonesian National Military in order to run Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) as follows.

- a. Purpose Principle, every operation administration must have a clear goal/purpose formula so it creates no doubt in the main tasks achievement.
- b. Unity of Command and Control Principle, all operation activities which are done in the OMSP framework are under one command/person in charge from State's institutions who is appointed based on valid laws of regulations.
- c. Proportionality Principle, it is understood that power, weapons, and Indonesian National Military's equipments which are assembled in the execution of the operations are done properly, not exaggerated, having a clear standardised operating procedures, away from actions which are out of appropriate limit.
- d. Security Principle, a precise action to guarantee the security, confidentiality, discretion of the movement, protection of private unit, and avoid the information spread to the enemy's side. Security principle is applied from planning, execution, until the end of the operation process with a purpose to avoid failure in OMSP execution.
- e. Legitimation Principle, it is inferred that OMSP execution which is done by Indonesian National Military is based on valid laws of regulations and state's political decision.
- f. Integrity Principle, considering that OMSP is an operation which involves institutions outside of Indonesian National Military, so there needs to be a same perception, a precise coordination, and integrity in the unit and support.
- g. Economic Principle, in OMSP there has to be a consideration of power use economically. All factors have to be taken into account carefully, so the execution can be assembled in an effective and efficient power.

By Military Operations Other Than War approach in the conflict tackling of armed criminal group (KKB), Indonesian National Military as a national defence function is obliged to be able to achieve the state's goal and to give protection and to develop the general prosperity of Indonesian society, including Papua. The strength of this model's approach is that it eases government side in this case president, head of region, or Commander of Military District Command to communicate between each other and cooperate to formulate the policy of conflict resolution of armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua. Meanwhile, the weakness of this approach is that it requires long mechanism and time consuming because it involves many stakeholders.

By considering horse trading method, counter-insurgency (COIN), and Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) approach, it can be concluded that the best method to solve armed criminal group (KKB) conflict in Papua is horse trading method. This is because that method focuses on happening-and-causing-conflict issues escalation. Therefore, the resolution can be directly pointed to what is being complained by Papuan local society.

So far, there has been no dialogue between Indonesian Government and KKB. Meanwhile, the importance of dialogue between Indonesian National Military and KKB has been a discourse since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Presidential Government, but it has never been done until his end of period. It is also the same as in Jokowi's Presidential Government. Through Indonesian National Military, actually it is expected to have a dialogue with KKB so the real demands from KKB can be understood more comprehensively. The Minister of Politic, Laws, and Defence Coordinator of Republic of Indonesia, Wiranto, in 2019 restated that the dialogue between government and armed group KKB is impossible to be done. Firstly, because the non-parallel position between criminal group and government, in government's point of view, they are criminal group which has to be caught and settled down. Secondly, there will be

doubt from KKB side whether in the mentioned dialogue, KKB is able to really declare what they want and Indonesian National Military will accept it, or this dialogue is supported by central government. And then thirdly, there is a big tendency from KKB side that they want no dialogue, because they have been considered as the state's enemy, and can be ambushed or caught by Indonesian Government at any time with separatism accusation (Febrianti et al., 2019).

Based on horse-trading mechanism, a dialogue still needs to be done to result a compromise. However, dialogue which has to be done based on this mechanism is between two balanced actors. Therefore, in the case between the Indonesian Government and KKB, a dialogue which is done between those both parties have to apply several adjustments. The status of KKB until now is a rebel or an insurgent which is under the responsibility of Indonesian government. That status is not possible for KKB to adjust their position as the same as a state and that position of course will not even be expected by Indonesian Government. Therefore, in this case, Indonesian Government as the party who needs to adjust its position in the mentioned dialogue. Indonesian Government can lower the level of the actor who joins the dialogue. Lowering the level of the actor mentioned earlier is decreasing in the term of quantity and military "attribute". Because government in general involves different government ranks and its nature is very state-centric (Febrianti et al., 2019).

For example, in a similar dialogue which was done by Indonesian Government in negotiation to free Indonesian Citizens who were held hostage by Abu Sayyaf's Group. Indonesian Government sent a negotiator who can discuss with the hostage taker and make use of the help of non-state actor's help who has a close relationship with The Southern Philippines society. In this case, Indonesian Government relied on the party who potentially can be more accepted by hostage takers with considering communication and information which were needed to be able to negotiate with hostage takers (Febrianti et al., 2019). That was can be done by Indonesian Government in joining a dialogue with conflict of armed criminal group (*KKB*) in Papua by lowering group's or individual's actor who represents the government but on the other hand is also an expert in negotiation and has adequate information to be able to declare Indonesian's demands and to listen to demands proposed by *KKB* in Papua.

In that dialogue, it is also important to listen to the real points and aims from *KKB* side in Papua which so far has been their demands and supposed to be fulfilled by Indonesian government side. Where in that dialogue the leader of armed criminal group (*KKB*) in Papua delivers the demands in written and in oral, so the central government step into Papua conflict area. Basically, it is not impossible to have a dialogue between Indonesian Government and armed criminal group (*KKB*) in Papua, in a big note that both parties can minimise ego between them, for the next future they can find each other's want which can be fulfilled together by both parties.

Beside changing actor who is involved in the dialogue, Indonesian Government also has to stress on the result which want to be achieved. It can be seen that efforts which have been made by the government only focus on the development in Papua. Meanwhile, aspects which are involved in the effort of situation restoration in Papua are not only about development. The government seems to forget other aspects such as violation, discrimination, and other gaps. In this case, the researcher points out that besides putting in development agenda, dialogue which is done has to be oriented to the fulfilling of basic human needs, including the absence of any violation and injustice in Papua. As it is mentioned by Galtung that a conflict can happen because basic human needs are not fulfilled.

Conclusion

By considering the condition of Papua's area and horse-trading, counter-insurgency (COIN), and Military operations other than war (OMSP) principle approaching technique, it is known that the best method to solve armed criminal group (*KKB*) in Papua is by horse trading method. Horse-trading method could be held without involving armed actions and

violations towards civilians. So far, there has been no dialogue between Indonesian Government and KKB. Meanwhile, dialogue between Indonesian National Military and KKB has been a discourse since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Presidential Government, but it has never been done until Joko Widodo's Presidential Era. Therefore, an open dialogue with concerned parties need to be held. Hence, horse-trading method is the most appropriate technique to solve the conflict between Armed Criminal Group (KKB) and Indonesian Government.

In the future dialogue using horse-trading method, it is also important to listen to the real points and purposes from KKB side in Papua which so far has been demanding and supposed to be fulfilled by Indonesian government. To fulfill the demands, Indonesian Government have to answer Papuan public disappointments, which include public service optimization, human development issues, infrastructure development, political justice, and racism issues. Meanwhile, the Papuan side also have to involve various stakeholders such as local governments, mass organizations, cultural communities, public figure, youth figures, etc. to represent the public demands. Through horse-trading method, Indonesian Government have the opportunity to give the best policy as a response to the occurring issues in Papua in order to resolve the conflict peacefully.

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